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Abstract. Liver transplantation is a necessary procedure to save the lives of thousands of 
people suffering from a multitude of diseases. Unfortunately, there are currently 14,301 
individuals in the United States in dire need of a liver currently on the wait list, with more 
people added each year than removed as a result of successful transplantation. This is 
largely due to the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984’s outlawing the compensation of 
donors for their organs, which, in concurrence with basic economic theory, has resulted in a 
vast supply shortage. This paper aims to assess the state of the organ transplantation system 
in the United States and make the case that compensation for organ donors will not only 
remedy the vast shortage, but would prove to be a more economical alternative than the 
status quo.  
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1. Introduction 
he liver plays a crucial role in the human digestive system. Among other 
things, it is responsible for the production of bile, a fluid that aids in the 
digestion and absorption of fats, and the absorption of vitamin K, which is 
necessary for the production of blood-clotting factors. Liver enzymes break down 
proteins from food into their constituent amino acids so they can be used by the 
body (Maher, 1997). The liver also stores glycogen, vitamins, and minerals for 
other organs and decomposes harmful substances like alcohol and other toxins. All 
in all, the liver is responsible for up to 500 separate functions and produces over 
1,000 essential enzymes and proteins. Needless to say, a well-functioning liver is 
critical for an individual’s health and well-being.  
Unfortunately, a number of diseases can impair or destroy liver function to the 
point that the liver is no longer capable of carrying out its many necessary tasks. 
Chronic viral hepatitis, alcoholic liver disease, acute liver failure, autoimmune 
hepatitis, nonalcoholic fatty liver disease, primary biliary cirrhosis, hepatic tumors, 
and several metabolic and genetic disorders are among the more common ailments 
that can render a liver defunct (Lucey, 2014). In such cases, when an individual’s 
liver no longer functions well enough to keep him or her alive, a liver transplant is 
the only viable remedy. 
Liver transplantation, also known as a hepatic transplantation, is a procedure in 
which a diseased or damaged liver is surgically removed and replaced with either a 
whole liver or, since the liver has regenerative capabilities, a portion of a healthy 
liver (Maher, 1997). The one-year survival rate after liver transplantation is about 
88 percent for all patients, and the five-year survival rate is about 75 percent 
(Lucey, 2014). While, as with any surgical procedure, there are numerous 
associated risks and possible complications, liver transplantation is largely a safe 
and highly recommended procedure, especially considering that there is often no 
viable alternative for the patient’s survival. Therefore, virtually all patients who 
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suffer from liver diseases that are severe enough to threaten their lives choose to 
undergo liver transplants, which raises the question: where do the healthy livers 
come from? 
Unfortunately for those who need them, livers cannot be bought and sold like 
most other goods in the United States. In 1984, the U.S. Congress passed the 
National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA), which outlawed the 
compensation of organ donors and established the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network (OPTN) to instead maintain a national registry for organ 
matching (‚About the OPTN‛). Because of this act, all solid organs, including 
livers, must be donated rather than sold. As such, as one might expect from basic 
economic theory, since the compensation that donors receive is anchored at zero, 
there exists a vast shortage of livers.   
Because of the numerous possible risks and trade-offs associated with donating 
a liver and the liver transplantation process, it is no surprise that very few live 
donors are willing to simply give away chunks of their livers for free. However, 
some level of compensation for donating a segment of a liver would surely 
outweigh those downsides and provide a meaningful incentive for at least some 
people to donate to a stranger.   
The purpose of this article is to investigate the characteristics of liver donations 
under the current allocation system, and consider how the characteristics of a free 
market for livers could benefit all stakeholders involved.  
 
2. History of organ and liver transplantation 
While attempts at organ transplantation date back to ancient times, the practice 
saw rapid advancement during the twentieth century. Successful organ 
transplantation is not possible without vascular anastomosis, which involves 
surgically connecting blood vessels that were previously separate. This practice 
was pioneered by Alexis Carrel in 1902 with animals, and for which he was 
awarded the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1912 (Azzam, 2012; Munshower, 2000).  
The second major hurdle for successful transplantation is the possibility of 
immunological rejection. During World War II, British physicians on numerous 
occasions attempted to administer skin grafts to Royal Air Force pilots who were 
severely burned in plane crashes. They found that skin transplanted from another 
individual quickly began to die and would fall off within days of transplantation. 
Discoveries in the 1940s led to the understanding that the problem was due to an 
immune response that treated the transplanted organ as a foreign antigen. As a 
result, throughout the 1950s, advancements were made in successfully suppressing 
the immune response with various drugs, including cortisone therapy and 6-
mercaptopurine (Azzam, 2012).  
As a result of these advancements, as well as revolutions in surgical techniques 
and suture materials, Dr. Joseph Murray, an American plastic surgeon, performed 
the first successful organ transplant in 1955, transplanting a kidney between 
identical twin sisters (Azzam, 2012; Munshower, 2000). Successive advances in 
the procedure, specifically with regard to effective immunosuppressive therapy 
preventing a transplanted kidney from being rejected by the recipient’s body, paved 
the way for liver transplantation among humans.  
Meanwhile, in 1955, C. Stuart Welch experimented with transplantation of an 
auxiliary liver in mongrel dogs. In 1958, building on Welch’s discoveries, Dr. 
Francis Moore described a standard technique of canine liver orthotopic liver 
transplantation (Azzam, 2012). (Orthotopic liver transplantation was the first kind 
developed; for a description of how it differs from other types, see the end of this 
section). In 1963, Dr. Thomas E. Starzl attempted the first human orthotopic liver 
transplantation in a 3-year-old boy, though the patient died during the operation 
(Azzam, 2012). However, despite the failure of the procedure itself, he was 
successful in creating an immunosuppressant drug therapy treatment to prevent 
organ rejection.  
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Prior to Starzl’s development of immunosuppressive treatments, a total of 244 
kidney transplantations were performed in the United States, though only 9 
recipients survived for over a year after the procedure. Death was typically a result 
of the body’s harsh rejection of the transplanted organ (Munshower, 2000). By the 
summer of 1964, thanks to Starzl’sbreakthrough, 200 kidney transplant centers 
around the United States were performing over 1,000 transplantations per year, 
with graft survival rates above 50 percent (Munshower, 2000). 
In 1964, the first successful heart transplant took place and, after numerous 
subsequent attempts and the tweaking of both the process and technique, Starzl 
performed the first successful clinical liver transplantation in 1967 (Munshower, 
2000).  
In 1969, the U.S. Public Health Service gave contracts to seven hospitals around 
the country to establish organizations to procure cadaveric kidney donations and 
provided funding for a computerized allocation system (Weimer, 2007). The Social 
Security Act Amendments of 1972 extended Medicare coverage for either kidney 
dialysis or transplantation to patients with chronic renal disease through the ESRD 
program, and amendments to the Act in 1978 extended coverage for 
immunosuppressive drugs following transplants from one to three years (Weimer, 
2007). However, at this point, only kidneys were successfully transplanted with 
high graft survival rates. Transplantation of vascular organs, such as the heart, 
lungs, and liver, which necessitate compatibility between the antigens of the 
transplanted organ and the antigens of the recipient’s body, resulted in extremely 
low graft survival rates, unless the immune system was suppressed to such a degree 
that the patient was highly vulnerable to common bacterial and viral infections 
instead (Azzam, 2012; Munshower, 2000). At the time, 95 percent of  transplant 
recipients of organs other than kidneys died within three months of the procedure 
(Munshower, 2000). 
In 1981, however, Swedish drug-manufacturer Sandoz began clinical trials for 
cyclosporine-A, an immunosuppressant that allowed recipients to accept organ 
transplants but still fight off viral and bacterial ailments (Azzam, 2012; 
Munshower, 2000; Weimer, 2007). This breakthrough boosted one-year graft 
survival rates of kidneys by 35 percent and allowed more vascular solid organs 
such as hearts, lungs, and livers to be transplanted with greatly reduced risk of 
organ rejection (Munshower, 2000). As a result, liver transplantation became a 
widely accepted procedure and, in 1982, pediatric liver transplantation garnered 
widespread public attention after two parents successfully secured a liver donor for 
their 11-month-old son Jamie Fiske (Weimer, 2007). Between 1981 and 1984, the 
number of liver transplantation centers grew from 13 to 34 (Munshower, 2000). In 
1983, Medicare coverage was granted for liver transplants. Soon enough, President 
Ronald Reagan, Speaker of the House Thomas O’Neill, and newscaster Dan Rather 
were among the many prominent figures who publicly endorsed pediatric liver 
transplantation, and used their media access and influence to assist particular 
families in seeking donors or financial support for their children with end-stage 
liver disease (Weimer, 2007). 
With the growing pervasiveness of transplantation in the United States during 
the 1980s, Congress, led by Representative Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tennessee) and 
Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts), passed 
the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 (NOTA) in an effort to prohibit 
preferential allocation of organs based upon ability to pay, as well as to replace the 
splintered allocation system then in place with a nationwide one that would unify 
organ allocation across various Organ Procurement Organizations (OPOs) 
(Weimer, 2007; Sullivan, 1983). The act called for the United States Department of 
Health and Human Services to contract with a nonprofit, nongovernmental 
organization to provide for the establishment and operation of a privately 
administered network of OPOs to encourage safe and effective procurement of 
cadaveric organs as well as to coordinate their allocation. The network became the 
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) that exists today 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 5(4), N. Ramanathan, p.367-382. 
370 
(Munshower, 2000). In addition, the act prohibited commerce in organs by making 
it unlawful for any person to knowingly ‚acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any 
human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the 
transfer affects interstate commerce,‛ in essence making it illegal for donors to be 
compensated for their organs (Weimer, 2007). In 1986, the Task Force on Organ 
Transplantation released a reportthat, among other things, strongly endorsed 
continued prohibition of commercialization of organs and argued for obtaining the 
consent from next of kin before the harvesting of cadaveric organs, pointing out 
that the donation of a cadaveric organ be should be considered an ‚altruistic act‛ as 
opposed to the sale of a commodity (Blumstein, 1989).  
The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1989 required that all hospitals performing 
organ transplants be members of the OPTN and abide by its rules to receive 
payment under Medicare or Medicaid, essentially strengthening the network’s 
status (Weimer, 2007).   
Today, several different procedures for liver transplantation exist, including 
auxiliary liver transplantation, when a healthy liver graft is implanted in addition to 
the native liver; reduced-size liver transplantation, involving the resection of an 
adult cadaveric liver so it may fit inside the body of a child or infant recipient; split 
liver transplantation, allowing for a donated cadaveric liver to be split into two and 
implanted into two different recipients, regenerating in each body; and living donor 
liver transplantation, involving resecting a piece of a liver from a living donor and 
transplanting it into a recipient’s body and allowing both to regenerate in each 
individual. Further research on the matter continues, with some researchers looking 
to hepatocyte and stem cell transplantation, in which a failing liver can itself be 
regenerated into a healthier one with cell implantation. However, all types of liver 
transplants fall under two broad categories: orthotopic liver transplantation, in 
which the host liver is removed from the body and replaced witha homograft, or a 
human liver from another individual, and auxiliary homotransplantations, in which 
the donor’s liver is inserted at an alternate site while the original liver remains. 
Orthotopic transplantation is the far more common form ofprocedure (Starzl, 
1982).  
Liver transplantation is now a very thoroughly researched procedure that is 
highly endorsed by the medical community worldwide. It has saved hundreds of 
thousands of lives, and continually proves to be a necessity for the survival of 
individuals of all ages and ethnicities suffering from a plethora of illnesses.  
 
3. Liver transplant procedure 
Many incremental improvements have been made to the field of surgical 
technique over the years. Orthotopic liver transplantation, which is by far the most 
common form of liver transplant procedure, is heavily focused on maintaining 
normal, stable blood pressurewhile achieving adequate vascular and biliary 
anastomosis (the surgical connection of blood vessels) and perfect hemostasis(the 
stopping of blood flow). The following are the steps in a typical orthotopic liver 
transplantation (Llado & Figueras, 2004; ‚Abdominal incisions in general surgery: 
a review‛): 
1. Abdominal Incision: The most commonly used incisions are the bilateral 
subcostal incision with midline extension, frequentlyreferred to as the Mercedes 
incisionor Makuuchi incision,which entails cutting open the abdominal cavity 
several inches below and parallel to the lowest rib, allowing for adequate exposure 
to the liver for dissection. 
2. Native Liver Removal: The next step is the cutting of the portal veins that 
convey blood to the liver from the other organs in the abdominal cavity, with most 
surgeons utilizing the‚piggy-back‛ technique in which the inferior vena cava, a 
large and important vein that carries deoxygenated blood from the lower two-thirds 
of the body directly to the heart, is preserved. This technique is associated with 
better stability ofblood pressure, lower blood transfusion requirements, and shorter 
time for surgery. Allthe hepatic veins are exposed with long enough venous cuffs 
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for the subsequent connections between the blood vessels of the body and the 
implanted liver, and clamped, while avoiding clamping the caval vein. The native 
liver is then removed. 
3. Vascular Anastamosis: Then, liver allograft begins. The donor’s upper 
vena cava is sutured to the cuff created with the three recipient hepatic veins. This 
is followed by the portal or arterial anastamosis. The ‚piggy-back‛ technique with 
a temporary portocaval shunt, which connects the portal vein, which accounts for 
75 percent of the liver’s blood flow, to the inferior vena cava, allows the surgeon to 
choose the order of the graft. After the anastamoses are complete, the portocaval 
shunt is taken down. 
4. Biliary Tract Reconstruction: Agall bladder removal, or cholecystectomy, 
is performed, after which the biliary tract reconstruction is performed so that the 
body is capable of storing and secreting bile. 
5. Hemostasis and Closure: After vascular and biliary anastamoses are 
completed, a reperfusion biopsy is performed to restore blood flow to the liver. 
Perfect hemostasis, or the stoppage of blood-flow, is ensured, drains are placed, 
and the wound is closed. Ensuring perfect hemostasis will prevent re-explorations 
and postoperative liver function abnormalities. 
 
4. Problems with current allocation system 
Prior to the National Organ Transplant Act, surgeons could use whatever organ 
allocation the organ procurement organization that received the organs chose, 
including allocating organs to parties who were willing to pay the highest price. 
This, however, resulted in surgeons allocating organs away from Medicare and 
Medicaid patients, who routinely paid only 50 percent of what private insurers and 
cash payers paid (Munshower, 2000). To provide transplants as part of federal 
entitlements, Congress needed to either pay more under entitlement programs to 
encourage allocation of organs toward Medicare and Medicaid patients or 
altogether alter the organ allocation method to limit physicians’ abilities to allocate 
organs to the patients of their choice. They chose the latter, essentially seizing 
control of all cadaveric organs and placing federal oversight over allocation of 
organs as a method of ensuring proportional allocation to Medicare and Medicaid 
recipients without having to pay a competitive market rate for the procedure 
(Munshower, 2000). 
Since, under the act, donors cannot be compensated for their organs, a large 
supply shortage exists, in concurrence with microeconomic theory. Figure 1 below 
depicts the supply of livers for transplantation from altruistic donors (labeled SDon), 
as well as the supply of livers that would exist if donors were compensated (labeled 
SComp), assuming that no altruistic donors are dissuaded from donating if they are 
offered compensation (Thorne, 2006). It is apparent that the supply of livers is 
vastly diminished when compensation in return is not offered.  
 
 
Figure 1. Supply of livers with and without compensation 
Source: Thorne (2006). 
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In addition to causing vast organ shortages, the system currently in place has 
essentially made geographic access a pricing mechanism instead. Consider how 
livers are currently allocated to patients. When an individual is deemed to be of a 
health status warranting a transplant, he or she is registered tothe waitlist of one of 
58 organ procurement organizations, based on which of the 58 corresponding 
designated service areas (DSAs) he or she resides in (Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network Policies, 112-115). The DSAs are also sorted into 
regions, which group together several adjacent states. The map below depicts the 




Figure 2. Map of organ procurement organizations and regions in the 48 contiguous 
states 
Notes: Pins represent each of the 58 OPOs, which are surrounded by corresponding DSAs. Color-
coded groups of states represent regions (11 total) 
 
Candidates aged 18 or older are assigned one of the following upon registration: 
- Adult status 1A 
- Calculated MELD score 
- Exception MELD score 
- Inactive status 
Candidates below the age of 18 are assigned one of the following upon 
registration: 
- Pediatric status 1A 
- Pediatric status 1B 
- Calculated MELD or PELD score 
- Exception MELD or PELD score 
- Inactive status 
Adult status 1A, the most severe assignment, indicates, in the case of candidates 
aged 18 or older, a patient with a life expectancy without a liver transplant of less 
than seven days and at least one of five conditions: fulminant liver failure; the 
patient is anhepatic, or liverless; primary non-function of a transplanted liver 
within 7 days of transplant; hepatic artery thrombosis (HAT); or acute 
decompensated Wilson’s disease. Among candidates below the age of 18, pediatric 
status 1A indicates that the candidate suffers from one of four specific ailments: 
fulminant liver failure, primary non-function of a transplanted liver, HAT, or acute 
decompensated Wilson’s disease. Pediatric status 1B indicates that the candidate 
suffers from one of three ailments (biopsy-proven hepatoblastoma without 
evidence of metastatic disease, organic acidemia or urea cycle defect and a MELD 
or PELD exception score of 30 points for at least 30 days, or chronic liver disease 
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with a calculated MELD or PELD score of greater than 25) (Organ Procurement 
and Transplantation Network Policies, 99-103).  
Apart from those extremely severe cases, most candidates are assigned a MELD 
or, if the candidate is less than 12 years of age, PELD score. The MELD score is 
calculated using a formula that takes into account creatinine, bilirubin, and INR 
levels, while the PELD score is calculated using a formula that takes into account 
albumin, bilirubin, and INR levels (Organ Procurement and Transplantation 
Network Policies, 102-103). A higher MELD or PELD score indicates a more 
severe need for a transplant, with the highest possible score being 40 (Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network Policies, 102).  
Should aliver for donation arise, the closest organ procurement organization 
claims it, filters out all candidates based on a match for blood type, and proceeds to 
allocate it according to the criteria depicted in Table 1, if the donor of the liver was 
between the ages of 11-17, Table 2, if the donor of the liver was less than 11 years 
of age, or Table 3, if the donor of the liver was 18 years of age or older, with a 
lower classification number corresponding to a higher claim on the organ.  
A key point is that, while most candidates register to anorgan procurement 
organization close to their residence, they are theoretically allowed to be tested and 
subsequently registered to a waitlist in how many ever OPOs they like, wherever 
they like, as long as the candidate and his transplant surgeon are able to receive the 
liver from the OPO’s transplant center in time to complete the transplantation 
within the liver’s cold ischemic time period (transplant window), which lasts up to 
12 hours (Furukawa et al., 1991). 
The consequences of this allocation methodology are easily observed. Patients 
awaiting a transplant are inclined to register to whichever OPOs they can, 
especially to the ones that will give them the highest chance of receiving a 
transplant. A study by three Michigan State University economists found that in 
states where motorcycle helmet laws were repealed, the number of transplantable 
organs from donors killed in motor vehicle accidents increased by 20 percent. After 
these supply shocks occurred, inflows to local transplant waitlists increased by 
roughly 12 percent (Dickert-Conlin, Elder, & Teltser, 2015). Candidates and their 
physicians observed the increase in the rate of allocation of organs to waitlisted 
candidates in a certain designated service area, and they subsequently responded by 
registering on those corresponding waitlists to take advantage of it.   
 
Table 1. Livers from 
donors aged 11-17 
Table 2. Livers from donors 
below age of 11 
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Source: OPTN Source: OPTN Source: OPTN 
 
There also exist other systematic differences across OPO regions in the 
availability of livers for donation. For instance, Region 3, which includes the Deep 
South, an area plagued by higher rates of obesity, high blood pressure, and diabetes 
as well as above average rates of fatal car accidents, procured 1,336 of the 7,841 
total livers in 2016. Region 9, which includes densely populated New York, only 
327 livers were procured in the same year (Bernstein, 2017). Certain regions 
procure organs at a rate vastly disproportionate to their populations, which results 
in the availability of donated organs differing significantly depending on the OPO 
region in question. There exist noticeable disparities on the demand side of the 
equation as well. In 2016, the median MELD score in Indiana was 20 while the 
median score in the Los Angeles area was 40 (Bernstein 2017). Urban centers have 
populations with higher rates of hepatitis C and fatty liver disease, and cities such 
as San Francisco with large Asian and Hispanic populations, who are more prone 
to liver disease, face disproportionately higher demand and therefore lower access 
to donated livers (Bernstein, 2017).  
The only barrier stopping individuals from registering to every one of the 58 
regional waitlists is that they cannot reasonably obtain a liver from the other side of 
the country and undergo the transplantation procedure within 12 hours. However, 
candidates have various levels of financial resources, and surely the number of 
waitlists a given candidate is registered to is commensurate with his or her 
financial ability to travel to far-away designated service areas at a moment’s notice. 
Consider, as an extreme case, billionaire Steve Jobs’s liver transplant in 2009. 
Jobs was likely on every designated service area’s waitlist and, when a liver 
became available to him in Memphis, Tennessee (a region where the average time 
spent on the waitlist before receiving a liver was just four months between 2002 
and 2007, compared to the national average of over one year) he flew in on his 
private jet from California in the middle of the night to receive it and undergo the 
transplant (Hainer, 2009).  
Furthermore, individuals from outside of the United States are also able to enter 
waiting lists for transplants in the United States, and this has attracted a large 
number of wealthy ‚medical tourists.‛ Between 2013 and 2016, 252 foreigners 
came to the United States for the sole purpose of receiving cadaveric liver 
transplants, while another 100 livers were allocated to foreigners staying in the 
United States as non-residents (Ornstein, 2017).  
Such measures are not available to the vast majority of individuals on the 
waitlists, and therefore this allocation system favors the wealthy few who can take 
such extraordinary measures. Insurance does not cover transportation to the 
transplant location, while it would cover the cost of paying for an organ if that were 
possible. As such, the current allocation system in place is actually less equitable 
than the system it replaced, in which livers could be bought and sold.  
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5. Compensation for kidney donors 
Considering the numerous pitfalls of the current waiting list and allocation 
system, a viable alternative could be a free market for organs in which individuals 
are compensated for donating organs while they are alive (i.e., donating one kidney 
or a segment of a liver), or promising to donate organs should they die and their 
organs be salvageable.  
Because kidneys are in far more demand than any other organ (81.2 percent of 
all organ transplant waitlist candidates are waiting for kidneys, compared to 11.9 
percent for livers), most research on compensation for organ donors has focused on 
kidneys (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources & 
Services Administration).  
Compensation for kidney donors has been considered by several researchers. In 
a qualitative study based on in-depth interviews of living kidney donors in New 
Zealand, researchers found that most of the 25 participants agreed that the kidney 
donation process was costly both in terms of time and money and many of them 
incurred personal costs and experienced financial hardship as a result of their 
benevolence. Fifteen of the 25 participants favored compensation in return for 
kidney donation, and nine favored reimbursements for specific costs, while none of 
the participants were opposed to all forms of compensation (Shaw & Bell 2014).  
A similar study was conducted among 19 kidney donors in Perth, Western 
Australia, all of whom were either genetically or emotionally related to the 
potential recipient. The participants reported having to take time off of work in 
addition to taking on travel expenses, and many of them encountered financial 
difficulties as a result of their donations (Cuesta-Briand, Way, & Boudville, 2015).  
One study published by Stanford economistsnotes that the U.S. government 
routinely spends tens of billions of dollars per year on kidney dialyses for Medicare 
and Medicaid recipients, and analyzes the cost-benefit of instead compensating 
individuals for donating kidneys to those in need. They conclude that, at a price of 
$45,000 per living kidney and $10,000 per cadaveric kidney, which they surmise 
would effectively negate the shortage, taxpayers would save about $12 billion per 
year, and recipients would become far more productive (Held, McCormick, Ojo & 
Roberts, 2015). 
In 1989 in Spain, the Organización Nacional de Transplantes (ONT), the 
national transplant authority, began a program in which organ procurement 
officials are allowed to offer monetary compensation, generally presented as 
funeral cost assistance, to families of deceased, potential donors (Beard, Kaserman 
& Osterkamp, 2013). As a result, the number of deceased donors increased from 
around 550 per year in the late 1980s to over 1,300 per year by the mid-2000s. In 
fact, prior shortages in the country have been eliminated and the waiting list has 
been reduced substantially. Figure 3 depicts the number of kidney donations per 
million citizens in Spain since the implementation of the program. 
In one study, researchers analyzed data on kidney donations in Spain since the 
program’s inception and found that the nation successfully ameliorated its prior 
shortage by 1997-1998, just under a decade after the program was implemented 
(Mixon, Jr. & Upadhyaya 2017).  
 
 
Figure 3. Number of kidney donation per million population in Spain 
Source: Organizacion Nacional de Transplantes 
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Unfortunately, due to lack of transparency and published figures, it is unknown 
exactly how much Spanish officials offered in compensation. The researchers who 
investigated the data note that the number of donations in Spain increased by 119 
percent, and reference survey evidence reported by Adams et al. in (1999) that 
suggested that compensating U.S. donors with $1,000, approximately equal to 
$1,470, would have been sufficient to increase the quantity of cadaveric organs 
supplied in the U.S. in 1996 by 117 percent. They claim that it follows that, since 
the increase in predicted donations by Adams et al. and the increase in actual 
donations in Spain were very close, that the Spanish officials must have been 
offering deceased donors’ families around $1,400 in today’s currency in euros 
(Mixon, Jr. & Upadhyaya, 2017). 
Drawing such a conclusion is a bit of a stretch, especially considering that, as 
the researchers acknowledge, Spain had relatively low dialysis populations 
compared to the U.S., indicating that the demand must have been far lower, and 
such a relationship may not have held constant when taking into account the sheer 
number of kidneys demanded in the United States. It is important to note, however, 
that the $1,470 for all cadaveric organs from a deceased individual suggested by 
Adams et al. is nowhere close to the $10,000 for a cadaveric kidney alone 
suggested by Held et al. Clearly the only way to get a true sense of the price of a 
kidney would be to make the trading of them legal and allow the free market price 
to equilibrate based on supply and demand.  
 
6. Differences between livers and kidneys 
There exist numerous differences between both the transplantation process for 
kidneys and livers and the nature of the organs themselves. These differences must 
be accounted for when comparing the potential compensation schemes for donors 
of each organ, especially in relation to each other.  
Every individual has two kidneys (only one of which is necessary for survival), 
but only one liver. However, just a segment of a liver can regenerate to full size. 
Therefore, in general, one of each organ can typically be procured from a live 
donor while two of each can be procured from a deceased donor (U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, Health Resources & Services Administration).  
When considering compensation of donors, the risk that the donors take on 
when undergoing a transplantation has to be taken into account. Kidney donors 
must typically stay in the hospital for 3-7 days, while liver donors must stay for 
approximately one week (Steiner, 2016; Llado & Figueras, 2017). Since both types 
of transplantation involve invasive surgery, all of the associated risks exist for both. 
While the majority of complications following surgery are not severe, they may 
cause longer hospitalization. For donations of both organs, lost wages from time 
spent in the hospital must obviously be considered when contemplating 
compensation for donors, and liver donors, on average, are hospitalized slightly 
longer than kidney donors.  
Risks associated with donating either organ include hernia, organ impairments 
or failure resulting in the need for transplantation (or dialysis in the case of 
kidneys), and death. Risks associated solely with kidney donation include high 
blood pressure and urination of large amounts of protein (Steiner, 2016). On the 
other hand, risks associated solely with donating a liver include wound infections, 
abdominal bleeding, bile leakage, narrowing of the bile duct, and intestinal 
problems including blockages and tears (Butt et al., 2012). So, there are 
significantly more possible complications associated with donating a liver than 
with donating a kidney, implying that other things being equal, liver donors would 
require higher compensation. 
 
7. Compensating liver donors to reduce shortage  
To increase the supply of livers, compensation schemes to encourage both more 
living and cadaveric donations would have to be created. Figure 4 depicts the 
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number of liver donations by live persons made in 2016 by relationship between 
donor and recipient. Even though any given individual in need of a liver would 
have far more compatible matches for donation among the general population with 
no relation to them, biological or otherwise, such donations comprise the minority 
of living liver donations (UNOS). In a way, the 252 donors who gave a liver to a 
relative, biological or otherwise, received compensation in the form of the 
satisfaction of their loved one’s improvement in health, if not survival. 
 
 




Figure 5. Liver donor by type 
Source: OPTN 
  
Figure 5 above depicts U.S. liver donations each year from 1988 to 2016. While 
the total number of transplantations has increased significantly, the number by 
living donors has plateaued and, as a proportion of all donations, has decreased. In 
2016, there were only 345 living liver donations, comprising 4.06 percent of all 
donations (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources & 
Services Administration).  
As Figure 6 below shows, the post-operative survival rates of recipients 
receiving living donor liver transplants are higher than those receiving cadaveric 
transplants (Hoehn, et al., 2014). Unfortunately for recipients, people are less 
inclined to donate an organ while they are still alive under the current system. 
Because of the sudden nature of liver supply from deceased donors (since the 
donor’s death usually cannot be predicted ahead of time with exactness), cadaveric 
livers can realistically only be sold to recipients able to receive the liver and 
undergo the transplant operation within the twelve-hour transplant window. A 
living donor’s liver, on the other hand, can be sold to anyone in the country, and 
therefore there would be far more demand for a living donor’s liver. Because of 
these factors, one would expect the price of a liver from a living donor to be higher 
than that of a cadaveric liver.  
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Figure 6. Survival rates of Living Donor (LDLT) and Deceased Donor Liver Transplants 
(DDLT) 
Source: Hoehn et al., (2014) 
 
The increased waiting times in the hospital for donors, coupled with increased 
risk of complications and higher mortality rates among recipients of cadaveric 
livers, imply that the difference in prices of a living liver compared to prices of a 
cadaveric liver would be larger than the difference in prices of a living kidney 
compared to the prices of a cadaveric kidney. So, for example, if Held, 
McCormick, Ojo, and Roberts are correct, and a cadaveric kidney would cost 
$10,000 while a living kidney would cost $45,000, or a premium of $35,000 for a 
living kidney, then the premium for a living liver over a cadaveric liver would 
likely be greater than $40,000.  
The first criterion that must be considered when considering transplants is 
compatibility between donors and recipients. Among livers, the two primary 
criteria for compatibility, and often the only considered criteria, are blood type and 
size (Starzl et al., 1982). Because of differences in blood antigens and antibodies, 
all recipients can receive livers from donors with either blood type O or the same 
blood type as themselves, except for recipients with blood type AB, who can 
receive livers from all blood types (Gordon et al., 1987). Table 1 below provides a 
breakdown of the percentage of the population that recipients can receive livers 
from depending on their blood types. With regard to size, because the liver must sit 
in the hepatic fossa without getting dislodged or twisting out of position, recipients 
typically receive livers from donors either the same size or larger than they are 
(Llado & Figueras, 2004). 
 
Table 4. Compatibility of blood types in transplantation 
Blood type Proportion of general population Can receive liver from 
0 45% 45% 
A 40% 85% 
B 11% 56% 
AB 4% 100% 
Source: Gordon et al., (1987). 
 
Based on blood type alone, since a liver donation from a donor with AB blood 
type can be utilized by only 4 percent of the population while a liver from a donor 
with blood type O can be used by 100 percent of the population, there will be 
differences in the quantity demanded of livers based on blood type. Whether or not 
these differences result in differences in prices depends on whether or not the 
quantity supplied varies from the quantity demanded. For instance, if donors and 
potential recipients are representative of the general population, which with large 
enough numbers they likely will be, then the 4 percent of donors that have type AB 
blood can donate to the 4 percent of recipients that have type AB blood. However, 
if for whatever reason the proportion of blood types among donors is not equal to 
the proportion of blood types among recipients, type O blood will be worth 
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relatively more than other blood types, since every recipient can receive a liver 
from a donor of type O blood. So, for instance, if there are not enough type B blood 
liver donors, type B blood potential recipients will have to compete with type O 
blood potential recipients for type O livers, thus driving up the price of type O 
blood livers relative to other types.  
In reality, due to the ethnic make-ups of various blood types as well as the 
disproportionate levels of donation among different ethnicities, potential recipients 
of type B blood require disproportionately more livers, while type B blood donors 
donate at disproportionately lower rates. As a result, recipients of type B blood 
consume a significant portion of the available type O and, on occasion, even type A 
livers (Ottmann, 2017). If healthy individuals of type B blood are compensated 
enough (likely at higher levels than their other blood-type counterparts), the 
disparity between supply and demand for type B blood livers could be eliminated. 
The positive effects of such a practice is twofold: recipients of type B blood livers 
will receive better matches at higher rates, while the demand for type O blood, and 
to a lesser extent, type A blood livers, would decline.  
Furthermore, since livers from larger donors can be transplanted into smaller 
recipients, but not vice versa, livers from larger donors would be in higher demand 
and, as a result, the price would be higher. 
In addition to blood type and patient size, the following factors are taken into 
consideration in some cases when matching a potential liver donor to a recipient 
and may affect the outcome of the transplantation: Age, Gender, Ethnicity, CMV 
(Cytomegalovirus) infection, HBV (Hepatitis B infection), HCV (Hepatitis C 
infection), Blood group A2 and HLA antigen matching (Reddy, Varghese, 
Venkataraman, & Rela 2013). These criteria are only considered in certain cases, 
and their impacts on the success of transplantation and survival among recipients 
are not entirely agreed upon, and therefore their impacts on prices would be subject 
to further research and future data on health outcomes. While their impact on 
pricing cannot be known now due to this fact, it is important to acknowledge their 
potential impact on pricing and demand.  
Overall, however, it is important to note that, under current practices, the 
likelihood that two random people will be a match for livers is higher than the 
likelihood that they’ll be a match for kidneys, since less matching tests are 
administered on average, and, therefore, the supply for livers would be relatively 
higher and would serve to reduce the relative price of livers to kidneys. However, it 
is possible that, if the supply of donated livers were to increase substantially, 
recipients might in turn demand livers that they are a relatively better match for, 
and as a result, those less important tests that might incrementally increase survival 
rates would likely become far more common.  
It is also important to consider the methodology of creating a market for livers. 
While, for living liver donors, it is up to the donor to choose to donate, and would 
then be up to the market-making body in place to find a recipient, things are not 
quite as easy for cadaveric liver transplants.  
One possible system that could be implemented for cadaveric liver transplants 
could be one in which people under the age of 40 (ideal candidates for donation 
should they die) (Reddy et al., 2013) could be offered a relatively small sum to 
undergo blood tests and have their height and weight measured, since this 
information is of utmost importance in matching donors with recipients. This 
information could then be cross-referenced with the current waitlist, and based on 
the demand for a liver of those characteristics, the market-making body could 
quote a price for the liver. If the potential donor is satisfied with the potential price, 
he or she can agree to it and sign a contract stipulating that, should they at some 
point be rendered in a brain-dead state, they agree to having his or her liver, and 
possibly other organs, to be harvested and donated, and in return his or her estate is 
compensated by the agreed upon amount.  
Such a system would solve two problems. Firstly, it would allow the market-
making body to have a better sense of how many donated livers it could expect to 
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collect. It could do this by collecting data on the probability that a given person 
under the age of 40 with the characteristics of the individuals in questions will be 
in a state in which his or her organs can be harvested, and can purchase enough 
future-liver-donor contracts accordingly. For instance, if the organization finds that 
individuals of a particular height and weight and a particular blood type have a 1 
percent likelihood of ending up in a brain-dead state before the age of 40, the 
organization can assume that, by purchasing futures on 100 such individuals, it can 
expect to collect on one such liver, and therefore fulfill demand for one such liver. 
If people are willing to plan for such outcomes, it is possible that such a system 
could act as a form a life insurance for potential donors.  
The second problem that this system solves is with regard to securing cadaveric 
organs in the first place. For people who do not declare that they would like to be 
organ donors, and end up in a brain-dead state, healthcare providers ask the family 
for permission to harvest the organs. In such cases, procurement rates of organs are 
only around 50 percent, and more often than not families have a difficult time 
deciding because they have no knowledge of their family members’ wishes with 
regard to organ donation (Roggenkamp, Aldridge, Guy & Rocheleau, 2007). By 
offering every individual a small sum just to get the requisite tests, and then 
allowing them to decide whether or not they want to sign up for organ donation, 
such cases of indecision could be avoided.  
 
8. Forms of compensation 
A common objection by critics of compensation for organ donation is that it can 
be used to exploit people and that mentally unhealthy or unstable individuals might 
sell their organs to fund drug use, gambling addiction, or other vices. While this is 
certainly a possibility, it is one that can be rectified by offering compensation in 
forms other than cash. Compensation can be offered in the form of tax credits, 
tuition, or a variety of other methods to dissuade criminals and other wrongdoers 
from taking advantage of such a system.  
The possibility of tax credits or tax relief specifically has been explored in detail 
with regard to kidneys already. In ‚The Kindest (Tax) Cut: A Federal Tax Credit 
for Organ Donations,‛ Satel and Viard propose that a $50,000 federal tax credit for 
a kidney donation from a living individual and a $5,000 federal tax credit for the 
donation of kidneys, intestines, the pancreas, the liver, and lungs would serve to 
both reduce the shortage of organs available for donation while saving the 
government billions of dollars a year (Satel & Viard 2017). They note that a tax 
credit, as opposed to a deduction, would be fully refundable and ensure that the tax 
savings that donors recognize would be independent of their tax bracket. They also 
propose an additional credit that would serve to reimburse donors for the costs of 
resulting follow-up medical care for any complications within three years of the 
transplant. Moreover, they note that a potential donor could be required to wait at 
least six months before the donation procedure takes place to ensure that he or she 
is not acting impulsively, and that the tax credit itself could be deployed over the 
course of several years, both of which serve to further prevent the system from 
being misused by financially unstable or desperate individuals. Such an incentive 
program could be administered for liver donors as well, and would likely serve to 
both increase liver donations while decreasing the burden of recipients of Medicare 
and Medicaid on the government, since, without a functioning liver, they require 
billions of dollars in medical care each year.  
 
9. Conclusions 
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 was implemented with the primary 
purpose of establishing equality among donated organ allocation. Unfortunately, 
however, it has resulted in a vast shortage of organs available to those in dire need, 
causing tens of thousands of deaths every year. Moreover, it has not eliminated the 
inequity in organ allocation, since wealthier individuals are still capable of multi-
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listing on several organ transplant waitlists at a time and receiving donations at a 
higher rate than their impoverished counterparts.  
Implementing a commercial market for organs, especially for livers, as 
discussed in this paper, would benefit virtually all of those in need by creating a 
real incentive for individuals to donate segments of their livers, or agree ahead of 
time to donate in the possible case of their brain death. Donors take on significant 
risk, as well as commit significant amounts of money to donations when 
considering travel, hospital, and forgone wage expenses, so compensating them in 
turn is one way to reasonably achieve adequate levels of procurement. Doing 
sowould allow those on waitlists to receive the organs they so desperately need 
without putting undue stress on those that decide to donate.  
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